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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
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Debtor 
 
NAGEL RICE LLC, 
Appellant 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:19-cv-13376) 
District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
_______________ 
Argued: March 2, 2021 
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: August 12, 2021) 
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Rabinowitz Lubetkin & Tully 
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Though bankruptcy settlements cannot please everyone, they must always be fair. A 
bankruptcy court approved a settlement that left a creditor with at most $50,000—and 
possibly $0—on its $160,000 claim. But the court based its approval on a factual premise 
that is not supported by the record. Because we cannot be sure that the deal was fair, we 
will vacate and remand. 
I. BACKGROUND 
America’s Insurance Center, an insurance agency, was deeply in debt. It owed $530,000 
to its minority owner Mark Levy and his company MBL. It also owed another $230,000 to 
two law firms: $70,000 to Olender Feldman and $160,000 to Nagel Rice.  
To pay these debts, America’s Insurance relied on its book of business. But by 2012, it 
could no longer service its accounts. So it sold them to a broker, who agreed to pay back 
40–45% of what he earned from them. It also promised all future commissions to Levy 
 




(who was president of America’s Insurance) to pay off its debts to him. The executive who 
represented America’s Insurance in this deal also worked for Levy at MBL.  
Though America’s Insurance had given its last assets to Levy, it still owed Olender 
Feldman, MBL, and Nagel Rice. So it went bankrupt. The bankruptcy court appointed a 
trustee. The only way the trustee could pay these debts was to claw back the commissions 
from Levy. To do so, the trustee would need to sue Levy for fraudulent conveyance. He 
thought he had “a good faith basis” to do that. App. 1683–84. After all, Levy was an insider, 
and there was a strong case that Levy had wrongfully grabbed America’s Insurance’s dwin-
dling assets for himself.  
But instead of suing Levy, the trustee struck a settlement: Levy would return $120,000 
in commissions and keep about $300,000 earned so far, plus all future commissions. And 
both Levy and MBL would give up their claims against America’s Insurance. Of the 
$120,000 that Levy returned, Olender Feldman would take $22,500.  
That left $97,500 to satisfy both the trustee’s administrative costs and Nagel Rice’s 
claim. Under the Bankruptcy Code, trustees are paid first. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2). Though 
the trustee had spent much more than $97,500, he agreed to cap his costs at $47,500, leav-
ing $50,000 for Nagel Rice. But there was a catch: if anyone appealed the settlement after 
the bankruptcy court approved it, the trustee would refuse to cap his fee—so Nagel Rice 
would get nothing.  
Nagel Rice was excluded from the negotiations, disliked the settlement, and objected. 
But the bankruptcy court was unmoved. If the trustee had sued Levy for fraud, it reasoned, 
he would have grossed at most $500,000. “[A]t that number,” and after subtracting 
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litigation costs and other creditors’ claims, the court “d[id]n’t see Nagel Rice doing much 
better than [$50,000].” JA 1911. So it found the deal fair and approved it. 
On appeal, the District Court agreed that $50,000 was fair. But since Nagel Rice had 
appealed, it now stood to get nothing. Nagel Rice objected to that term as a poison pill that 
penalized its right to appeal. The District Court disagreed and affirmed. Now Nagel Rice 
appeals to us, challenging both the original $50,000 and the $0 it stands to get if we affirm. 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE SETTLEMENT 
A bankruptcy court may not approve a settlement unless it is “fair and equitable.” Pro-
tective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 
414, 424 (1968). We review its factual findings for clear error and its approval of the set-
tlement for abuse of discretion. Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1992); In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The court’s approach was reasonable. It compared the $50,000 that Nagel Rice would 
get from the settlement with how much it could have gotten if the trustee had sued Levy. 
If the court were right that Nagel Rice would have done no better than $50,000, then the 
settlement would have been fair (at least without the appeal condition). 
But the court erred in its calculation. It found that the trustee’s suit would have grossed 
no more than $500,000. We see no support in the record for that number. If the trustee had 
sued Levy and won, he could have recovered all the commissions that Levy had taken plus 
future ones. By the time of the settlement in 2019, Levy had earned at least $410,000, and 
commissions had been worth roughly $80,000 per year. So if the commissions had contin-
ued for even a couple more years, the trustee might have recovered well over $500,000. 
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The court, however, thought that the commissions would dry up soon after a lawsuit. It 
believed that America’s Insurance needed Levy’s help to service its old insurance custom-
ers. If Levy lost his right to commissions, the court reasoned, he would stop helping and 
the income would evaporate.  
There is no evidence of that. Indeed, the trustee conceded at oral argument that “there 
isn’t a specific fact which supports a conclusion that … [if] Levy’s services terminate 
th[en] the income stream terminates.” Oral Arg. Tr. 35. True, America’s Insurance needed 
someone with a broker’s license to accept the commissions. But there was no evidence that 
it had to be Levy. 
The court thus erred in finding that a fraud suit would gross at most $500,000. Yet that 
number was the key to finding the deal fair. So the court was wrong to approve the deal 
based on this reasoning. 
III. ON REMAND, THE BANKRUPTCY COURT SHOULD TAKE A 
CLOSER LOOK AT ANY APPEAL CONDITION 
Because we must vacate the settlement, we need not rule on the condition that the trus-
tee would refuse to cap his fee if anyone appealed, leaving Nagel Rice with nothing. But if 
the trustee proposes a new settlement with a similar condition, the court should study it 
more closely. 
The condition meant that if Nagel Rice lost on appeal, it would forfeit $50,000. Nor-
mally, courts may not punish parties for appealing. They may not, for instance, resentence 
a criminal defendant more harshly just because he appealed his first sentence. North Car-
olina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723–25 (1969). Nor may they threaten to revive a 
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counterclaim if the plaintiff appeals. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 
(7th Cir. 1974); cf. Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1128 (3d Cir. 1990) (forbid-
ding the use of pressure to force a settlement). Yet litigants may end up worse after an 
appeal for separate, valid reasons. For instance, after a criminal defendant successfully ap-
peals and he is convicted again, the court may give him a higher sentence based on newly 
discovered evidence. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. 
Here, there may have been a valid reason to give Nagel Rice less if it appealed. The 
appeal added administrative costs. And in bankruptcy, the debtors must share those costs. 
So making Nagel Rice cover part of the costs of appeal may have been reasonable. 
But we are not sure that the specific condition here fit that goal. The court made no 
findings about the reasonable costs of appeal, much less Nagel Rice’s fair share of it. If the 
court considers a similar condition on remand, it should look at those issues more closely. 
* * * * * 
Because the court’s approval of the settlement rested on an unsupported factual prem-
ise, we will vacate and remand. 
1 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 We review a court’s approval of a bankruptcy settlement for abuse of discretion. 
In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 2006). Absent “a definite and firm 
conviction” that it made a mistake, we will not disturb the court’s decision. Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 
F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001)). The Majority holds that the bankruptcy court erred by 
basing its approval of the settlement on an unsupported factual premise. According to the 
Majority, the record does not support the bankruptcy court’s $500,000 valuation of Nagel 
Rice’s lawsuit. I respectfully disagree. 
 The bankruptcy court’s valuation of the lawsuit is supported by the record. The 
court credited the trustee’s testimony that the litigation would be complex, expensive, and 
time-consuming. The trustee thought the $500,000 figure was too high, and Nagel Rice 
thought it was too low. The court considered the arguments on both sides and chose 
$500,000 as the middle ground. The parties sharply dispute the lawsuit’s value, but “the 
court is not supposed to have a ‘mini-trial’ on the merits.” See In re Key3Media Grp., 
Inc., 336 B.R. 87, 93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (cleaned up), aff’d, No. 03-10323, 2006 WL 
2842462 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2006). I am satisfied that the bankruptcy court weighed the 
appropriate factors and reached a reasonable conclusion about the future value of a 
hypothetical lawsuit. See In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996). Because I find no 
abuse of discretion, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
